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Thinking about policy mixes is at the forefront of current research work in 
the policy sciences and raises many significant questions with respect to 
policy tools and instruments, processes of policy formulation, and the 
evolution of tool choices over time. Not least among these is the potential 
for multiple policy tools to achieve policy goals in an efficient and effective 
way. Previous work on policy mixes has highlighted evaluative criteria such 
as "consistency" (the ability of multiple policy tools to reinforce rather than 
undermine each other in the  pursuit of individual policy goals), 
"coherence" (or the ability of multiple policy goals to co-exist with each 
other in a logical fashion), and 'congruence" (or the ability of multiple 
goals and instruments to work together in a uni-directional or mutually 
supportive fashion) as important design principles and measures of 
optimality in policy mixes. And previous work on the evolution of policy 
mixes has highlighted how these three criteria are often lacking in mixes 
which have evolved over time as well as those which have otherwise been 
consciously designed. This paper revisits work in this latter tradition in 
order to more clearly assess the reasons why many policy mixes are sub-
optimal and the consequences this has for thinking about, and practices of 
policy design. Adding the dimensions of 'Intentionality', ‘Context’, 
“Goodness of Fit’ and ‘Degrees of Freedom’ to earlier thinking about 
processes such as policy layering, conversion, and drift, it is argued, helps 
to make sense out of these different processes and how they relate to 
'design'. More precise specification of the nature of policy change reveals 
the need to distinguish different design processes such as 'policy patching' 
from the usual assumptions made about wholesale policy replacement, the 
conditions under which they are likely to emerge and the practical activities 
required to enhance policy consistency, coherence and congruence.  
 
Introduction: Policy Portfolios and Policy Design 
Public policies are the result of efforts made by governments to alter aspects of 
behaviour – both that of their own agents and of society at large - in order to carry out 
some end or purpose and, to do so, they are comprised of complex arrangements of 
policy goals and policy means. These efforts can be more or less systematic and the ends 
and purposes attempted to be attained are multifarious and wide-ranging. Thus, policy 
design encompasses both the means or mechanisms through which policy goals are given 
effect and the goals themselves, since goal articulation inevitably involves considerations 
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of feasibility or what is practical or possible to achieve in given conjunctures or 
circumstances with the means at hand (Majone 1975; May 2005; Gilabert and Lawford-
Smith 2012).
1
   
In some circumstances, policy decisions will be more highly contingent and 
„irrational,‟ that is, driven by situational logics and opportunism rather than careful 
deliberation and assessment, than others (Kingdon 1984; Cohen, March and Olsen 1979; 
Dryzek 1983; Eijlander 2005; Franchino and Hoyland 2009). Should all - or any - of 
these efforts be thought of as embodying a conscious „design‟? In most cases the answer 
is „yes‟. The high level of contingency in public policy decision-making has led some 
critics and observers of policy design efforts to the opposite conclusion, suggesting that 
policies cannot be „designed‟ at all, at least in the sense that a house or a piece of 
furniture can be the product of design. But those who have written about policy design, 
disagree with this assessment and, recognizing the dialectic of principle and context, 
distinguish carefully the design or formulation process from the actual design of a policy 
itself. Even when the goals pursued are questionable, or when the knowledge or the 
means utilized to achieve them are much more ad hoc and much less systematic than 
might be desired, as long there is a desire for effective resource use in goal attainment, 
policy-making will involve some effort at design. However, this does not mean that all 
designs are created equal or generate equally successful results. The systematic study of 
policy designs and design processes is required for the field to advance. 
In their many works on the subject in the late 1980s and early 1990s for example, 
Stephen H. Linder and B. Guy Peters argued that the actual process of public policy 
decision- making could, in an analytical sense, be divorced from the abstract concept of 
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policy design. In much the same way, the development of an architectural plan can be 
distinguished from its engineering or construction manifestations at the concept stage and 
from the factors which led to its adoption, if not actually its implementation. Optimal 
policy designs in this sense can be thought of as „ideal types‟, that is, as configurations of 
elements which can reasonably be expected, if adopted with due attention given to 
specific contextual settings and needs, to have a high probability of delivering a specific 
outcome.  
As Linder and Peters argued therefore „design‟ can be distinguished from „non-
design‟ by the presence of a prior intellectual scheme or set of principles which 
influences the creation and implementation of a policy: 
 
"Design then, is not synonymous with instrumental reasoning but certainly 
relies greatly on that form of reasoning. Moreoever, the invention or 
fashioning of policy options is not designing itself and may not even call on 
any design. While somewhat at odds with conventional (mis)usage, our 
treatment focuses attention on the conceptual underpinnings of policy rather 
than its content, on the antecedent intellectual scheme rather than the 
manifest arrangement of elements. As a result, the study of design is 
properly „meta-oriented‟ and, therefore, one step removed from the study of 
(actual) policy and policy-making." (Linder and Peters 1988: 744) 
 
 
A focus on these intellectual a priori’s and meta-conditions, they argued, helps to 
improve policy-making by better linking of tools to contexts. But exactly how this is to 
be done, generally, is poorly described and analyzed in the existing design literature. 
This paper explores this meta-orientation to the study of policy design. It does so 
by revisiting some „first principles‟ for policy portfolio design found in the literature, 
then addresses the nature of the evaluative criteria used to assess „good‟ and „poor‟ 
design. It then moves on to consider the issue of the „degrees of freedom‟ or room to 
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manouevre which designers have in developing and implementing their designs. Finally 
it turns to the notion that two distinct and very different types of design processes have 
been incorrectly juxtaposed in the literature: policy patching and policy packaging. 
 
Policy Design Principles and Practices Considered 
Complex problems, it is said, require complex arrangements of institutions and 
instruments to successfully address them. Policy designers create policy alternatives, 
some of which, or parts of which, may ultimately be implemented in order to attempt to 
achieve desired outcomes. These are alternative options for how government action can 
be brought to bear on some identified problem. 
Thus design is both a „verb‟ – in the sense of a process of creating a policy 
configuration sensitive to the constraints of time and place – and a „noun‟ – in the sense 
of being an actual product or artifact that can be compared to known principles of good 
design (May 2003). Policy design as a verb involves coordinating disparate actors 
towards agreement on designs-as-a-noun in working towards identifying policy 
alternatives capable of achieving policy goals in a given spatio-temporal context.  
But what is it that is „designed‟ in policy design? In all but the very simplest 
contexts, alternatives are composed of different sets of  policy means – that is policy 
tools and their calibrations – bundled together into packages of measures expected to 
attain specific kinds of outcomes (Doremus 2003; Howlett 2005 and 2011).
2
 “Policy 
design" in this sense  refers to both the manner in which policy tools or instruments are 
combined in a principled manner to attain policy goals, and the processes by which those 
designs are made and adopted.  
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Like planning, policy design theory has its roots in the „rational‟ tradition of 
policy studies, one aimed at improving policy outcomes through the application of 
policy-relevant knowledge to the crafting of alternative possible courses of action 
intended to address specific policy problems (Cahill and Overman 1990).
3
 But it extends 
beyond this to the consideration of the practices, frames of understanding, and lesson-
drawing abilities of policy formulators or “designers” in adapting design principles to the 
particular contexts that call for policy responses (Bobrow 2006; Schneider and Ingram 
1988).  
Analyzing policy design in the context of designing policy mixes raises a series of 
questions about how the superiority of one portfolio design over another can be assessed. 
Not all designs are equal nor is one design just as good as any other, and a subject of 
much interest to students of policy designs, therefore, is the nature of the evaluative 
criteria which can be used to identify “better” or „intelligent‟ design and distinguish it 
from „poor‟ design or non-design. Various „design principles‟ articulated at various 
points in the history of studies of policy tool choice and instrument selection have 
attempted to address this issue of how can the superiority of a mix be evaluated.  
 Rules have been proposed both about how many tools there should be in a bundle 
and how these tools should be selected. The former is a subject which received some 
attention in the early 1950s and resulted in several „rules‟ for policy design which 
emphasized aesthetics of simplicity and elegance, while the latter received some attention 
in the 1970s and 1980s as scholars emphasized a need to eschew a knee-jerk preference 
for highly coercive tools and instead begin slowly with the least „interventionist‟ tools 
possible before „moving up‟ to more coercive designs. Thirdly, there is the questions of 
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how exactly tools fit together or should be fit together into a policy bundle or instrument 
mix. This is the classic and most commonly addressed issue in studies of policy mixes to 
date and centers on the issue of „smart‟ design or the need to avoid conflicts and enhance 
complementarities in the articulation of policy tools.  
While these areas were the subjects of most early thinking about policy mixes, 
more recent design thinking has addressed a second series of questions related to 
matching tools to their policy environments. That is, „design‟ is seen as a dialectic 
between the (social) construction and (ecological) adaptation of policy (Lejano, 2006) or 
between „principle‟ and „context‟ (Lejano and Shankar 2013). It is “the effort to more or 
less systematically develop efficient and effective policies through the application of 
knowledge about policy means gained from experience, and reason, to the development 
and adoption of courses of action that are likely to succeed in attaining their desired goals 
or aims” (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Bobrow 2006).  
As such there is the issue of what kind of „goodness of fit‟ should exist between 
context and design. This issue has been explored from both a „spatial‟ and a „temporal‟ 
vantage point and has focused attention on criteria such as „consistency‟, „coherence‟, 
and „congruence‟ as goals which complex designs should aspire towards. And there are 
also questions about how much room to manoeuvre or how many „degrees of freedom‟ 
designers have in any design circumstance: that is, how closely they must adhere to 
existing and pre-existing policy elements and how far they can go in proposing 
alternative designs to the status quo. Such considerations often have led to suggestions 
that designs should retain adequate „flexibility‟ or adaptive elements to allow them to be 
adjusted once in place (Walker et al 2010; Swanson et al 2010) and have often promoted 
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„policy experiments‟ as a means to determine policy fit in practice (Hoffman 2011; 
Vreugdenhill et al 2012). Each of these new and old design maxims are discussed in 
more detail below. 
 
Older Design Maxims and Their Problems 
Parsimonious Tool Use  
The older literature on policy design suggests several maxims or heuristics which can be 
used to head off common errors in policy-making. The first and oldest of these is to 
observe parsimony in tool selection. An oft-cited rule in this area, for example, is that the 
optimal ratio of the number of tools to targets is 1:1 (Knudson 2009) an axiom first put 
forward by Jan Tinbergen in 1952 (Tinbergen 1952) who argued that the number of 
policy tools in any mix should roughly match the number of goals or objectives set for 
the policy. 
This may appear to be a reasonable rule-of-thumb, for which Tinbergen provides 
some logical justification in his discussion of information and administrative costs 
associated with redundant tools in the area of economic policy. However, the reasoning 
behind this rule is suspect, assuming that utilizing more instruments costs less than fewer, 
and this maxim translates easily enough into a basic efficiency calculus for the attainment 
of policy ends, but loses its precision in so doing. 
In his work, for example, Tinbergen analyzed what he termed the „normal‟ case in 
which it was possible to match one goal with one target so that one instrument could 
fully address its task and accomplish the goal set out for it. Most observers, however, 
including Tinbergen, were and are well aware that combinations of tools are typically 
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used to address a policy goal, not a single instrument. As Tinbergen (1952 p. 37) himself 
argued “A priori there is no guarantee that the number of targets always equals the 
number of instruments” and (p. 71) “it goes without saying that complicated systems of 
economic policy (for example) will almost invariably be a mixture of instruments”.  
 These admonitions, unfortunately, have generally been neglected in studies 
ostensibly based on Tinbergen‟s work, with many studies attempting to force complex 
situations into the more simple mould required for Tinbergen‟s rule to apply (Knudson 
2009). Moving „beyond the Tinbergen Rule‟ is necessary if policy design principles are 
to inform modern design contexts and practice in a meaningful way. 
Moving Up the Scale of Coercion in Sequential Instrument Choices 
A second principle of policy design found in the older literature on the subject was not 
only to be parsimonious in the number of instruments chosen at a specific point in time to 
attain a goal, but also dynamically or sequentially. In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, for 
example, Bruce Doern, Richard Phidd, Seymour Wilson and others published a series of 
articles and monographs that placed policy instruments on a single continuum based on 
the „degree of government coercion‟ each instrument choice entailed (Doern 1981; Doern 
and Phidd 1983; Doern and Wilson 1974; Tupper and Doern 1981) and argued that tool 
choices should only „move up the spectrum‟ as needed from minimum towards 
maximum.
4
     
 This rationale was based on an appreciation of the ideological preferences of 
liberal-democratic governments for limited state activity and on the difficulties posed for 
the exercise of this preference by the relative political "strength" of the societal actors in 
resisting government efforts to shape their behaviour. Assuming that all instruments were 
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more or less technically "substitutable" or could perform any task - although not 
necessarily as easily or at the same cost - they argued that in a liberal democratic society, 
governments, for ideological reasons, would prefer to use the least coercive instruments 
available and would only "move up the scale" of coercion as far as was necessary in 
order to overcome societal resistance to attaining their goal. As Doern and Wilson put it:  
 ...politicians have a strong tendency to respond to policy issues, (any issue) by 
moving successively from the least coercive governing instrument to the most 
coercive. Thus they tend to respond first in the least coercive fashion by creating 
a study, or by creating a new or re-organized unit of government, or merely by 
uttering a broad statement of intent. The next least coercive governing instrument 
would be to use a distributive spending approach in which the resources could be 
handed out to constituencies in such a way that the least attention is given as to 
which taxpayers‟ pockets the resources are being drawn from. At the more 
coercive end of the continuum of governing instruments would be a larger 
redistributive programme, in which resources would be more visibly extracted 
from the more advantaged classes and redistributed to the less advantaged classes. 
Also at the more coercive end of the governing continuum would be direct 
regulation in which the sanctions or threat of sanctions would have to be directly 
applied (Doern and Wilson 1974). (p. 339) 
 
This formulation has many advantages as a design principle. It is not uni-
dimensional, although it might appear so on first reading, because it does take into 
account several political and contextual variables and assumes instrument choices are 
multi-level, with finer calibrations of instruments emerging after initial broad selections 
have been made.  
That is, it assumes that both state and societal interests in liberal-democratic 
regimes prefer a minimal state and choose instruments accordingly after an initial 
decision to alter the status quo has been made (Howlett 1991). Preferring "self-
regulation", for example, governments would first attempt to influence overall target 
group performance through exhortation and then add instruments only as required in 
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order to compel recalcitrant societal actors to abide by their wishes, eventually 
culminating, if necessary, in the public provision of goods and services.  
This is not an unreasonable conclusion, based as it is on extensive observation of 
the actual design practices followed by many governments. However, as Woodside 
(1986) argued: 
Experience suggests that governments do not always seek to avoid coercive 
solutions, but indeed, may at times seem to revel in taking a hard line from the 
start. While there are undoubtedly many reasons for these heavy handed 
responses, surely some of the  most important ones include the constituency or 
group at which the policy is aimed, the circumstances in which the problem has 
appeared, and the nature of the problem involved (p. 786). 
 
 
Hence, once again, in order for studies of policy design to move forward simple 
admonitions and principles such as this should be avoided and contextual variables 
related to governance structures and processes must be more carefully analyzed and 
integrated into design thinking.  
 
Coherence, Consistency and Congruence as Measures of Design Integrity and 
Superiority 
 
More recent work on policy design and policy mixes has focused on the need for 
the various parts of a mix or portfolio to be integrated for maximum effectiveness. 
Policies are composed of several elements: distinguishing between abstract or 
theoretical/conceptual goals, specific programme content or objectives, and operational 
settings or calibrations (Hall 1993; Howlett and Cashore 2007 and 2008). These are set 
out in Figure 2 below. And the design literature has recognized that some correspondence 
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across these elements is required if policy goals are to be integrated successfully with 
policy means (Howlett and Cashore 2007).  
Previous work on policy design has identified evaluative criteria such as 
"consistency" (the ability of multiple policy tools to reinforce rather than undermine each 
other in the pursuit of policy goals, the relationships within the unshaded area in figure 1), 
"coherence" (or the ability of multiple policy goals to co-exist with each other and with 
instrument norms in a logical fashion, the relationships within the shaded area in figure), 
and 'congruence" (or the ability of goals and instruments to work together in a uni-
directional or mutually supportive fashion, the relationship between the shaded and 
unshaded areas in Figure 2) as important measures of optimality in policy mixes 
following this integrative logic (Howlett and Rayner 2007; Kern and Howlett 2009).  
 
FIGURE 2 - Components of a Policy Mix 
   Policy Content  








What General Types of 




 protection, economic 
 development) 
OBJECTIVES 
What Does Policy Formally 
Aim to Address? 
 
(e.g. saving wilderness or species 
habitat,  increasing harvesting 
levels to create processing jobs) 
SETTINGS 
What are the Specific 
On-the-ground 
Requirements  of Policy 
(e.g. considerations about 
the optimal size of 
designated stream-bed 
riparian zones, or 














(e.g. preferences for the use 
of coercive instruments, or 
moral suasion) 
MECHANISMS 
What Specific Types of 
Instruments are Utilized? 
 
 
(e.g. the use of different tools 
such as tax incentives, or public 
enterprises) 
CALIBRATIONS 
What are the Specific 
 Ways in Which the 
 Instrument is used? 
(e.g. designations of 
higher levels of subsidies, 
the use of mandatory vs 
voluntary regulatory 
guidelines or standards) 
Source: Modified from Cashore and Howlett (2007) 
 13 
 
However, while clear enough in theory, empirical work on the evolution of policy 
mixes has highlighted how these three criteria are often weakly represented in existing 
mixes, especially those which have evolved over a long period of time (Howlett and 
Rayner 2006; Rayner and Howlett 2009). That is, discussions of policy designs do not 
take place in an historical vacuum and an issue which is especially vexing for intelligent 
design studies is the extent of the constraints imposed on design by the temporal 
evolution of tool portfolios.  
Many existing studies assume, whether explicitly to implicitly, that any 
combination of tools is possible in any circumstance. That is, that decision-makers have 
unlimited degrees of freedom in their design choices. Empirical studies, however, have 
noted this kind of freedom in combining design elements is only to be found in very 
specific circumstances – what Thelen (2003) terms „replacement‟ or „exhaustion‟ – when 
older tool elements have been swept aside or abandoned and a new mix can be designed 
or adopted de novo. These circumstances are quite rare and most existing mixes or 
portfolios have been found to have emerged from a gradual historical process in which a 
policy mix has slowly built up over time through processes of incremental change or 
successive reformulation – processes that historical institutionalists, such as Thelen 
(2003), Hacker (2004) and others, term “layering”, “drift”, or “conversion”.  
 
 
Modern Principles of Policy Design: Complementary Effects, Goodness of Fit and 
Degrees of Freedom 
More contemporary thinking about policy design begins not with single instrument 
choices at specific moments in time de novo, but rather with considerations of designing 
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mixes (sometimes referred to as bundles or portfolios) of tools which specifically take 
into account the spatio-temporal complexities missing in previous design maxims 
(Howlett 2011; 2005). These studies take very seriously the need to „match‟ design to 
both spatial and temporal contexts that were lacking in earlier studies.  To this end they 
have developed a new set of maxims to replace those earlier ones found faulty when 
applied to policy-making practice. These include “maximizing complementary effects”, 
better matching policy designs and policy designing or formulation activities, and the 
need to match policy designs with governance contexts. Each of these is addressed below. 
 
Maximizing Complementary Effects  
Recent design thinking has underlined the importance of considering the full range of 
policy instruments when designing a mix rather than assuming that a choice must be 
made between only a few alternatives such as regulation versus market tools 
(Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair 1998).  
 However, a major issue for such studies is the fact that not all of the tools involved 
and invoked in a mix are inherently complementary (Tinbergen 1952; Grabosky 1995; 
Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair 1998; del Rio et al 2011; Boonekamp 2006) in the 
sense that they evoke contradictory responses from policy targets (Schneider and Ingram 
1990a, 1990b; 1993; 1994; 1997; 2005). Some combinations, of course, may be more 
virtuous in providing a reinforcing or supplementing arrangement (Hou and Brewer 
2010). And some other arrangements may also be unnecessarily duplicative while in 
others some redundancy may be advantageous (Braathen and Croci 2005; Braathen 2007).  
 That is, as Grabosky (1995) and others suggested, some tools counteract each other 
– for example, using command and control regulation while also attempting voluntary 
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compliance – while, as Hou and Brewer (2010) argued, other tools complement or 
supplement each other – for example, using command and control regulation to prevent 
certain behaviour deemed undesirable and financial incentives to promote more desired 
activities. 
 A key principle of current policy design thinking, therefore, is to try to maximize 
supplementary effects while minimizing counterproductive ones. “Smart‟ design implies 
creating packages which take these precepts into account in their formulation or 
packaging (Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair 1998; Gunningham and Sinclair 1999; 
Eliadis, Hill and Howlett 2005).  
 
Goodness of Fit: The Need for Designs to Match Governance Mode and Policy Regime 
Capacities 
Contemporary design theory also highlights the need for designs to respond to particular, 
context-dependent features of the policy sector involved. In this sense, “goodness of fit” 
between tool and context is a concern in contemporary policy design considerations and 
can be seen to occur at several different levels.  
At one level design choices emerge from and must generally be congruent with 
the governance modes or styles practiced in particular jurisdictions and sectors (Howlett 
2009). That is, different orientations towards state activity require different capabilities 
on the part of state and societal actors and since different governance modes or styles rely 
on these to greater or lesser degrees, policy designs must take into account both the 
desired governance context and the actual resources available to a governmental or non-
governmental actor in carrying out its appointed role.  
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Thus, for example, planning and „steering‟ involve direct co-ordination of key 
actors by governments, requiring a high level of government policy capacity to identify 
and utilize a wide range of policy tools in a successful policy „mix‟ or „arrangement‟ 
(Arts, Leroy and van Tatenhove, 2006; Arts and van Tatenhove, 2000). Work on „policy 
styles‟ (Kagan 2001, Richardson et al 1982, Freeman 1985) identified common patterns 
and motifs in the construction of typical policy designs in different jurisdictions 
reflecting such concerns (Kiss et al 2012; Howlett 2011 and 2009).  
 While many permutations and combinations of possible governance arrangements 
exist, recent policy and administrative studies have focused on four basic or „ideal‟ types 
found in many jurisdictions and sectors in liberal democratic states. These are the legal, 
corporate, market and network governance forms. Each mode (see Figure 3 below) has a 
different focus, form of control, aim and preferred service delivery mechanism and 
procedural policy orientation.  
 Government actions through legal and network governance can change many 
aspects of a socio-technical system but do so indirectly through the alteration of the 
relationships existing between different kinds of social actors. This is unlike corporate 
and market governance which involves more overt state direction. This relationship 
between governance style and instruments is a significant one for studies of policy design. 
Since the exact processes by which policy decisions are taken vary greatly by jurisdiction 
and sector and reflect great differences between and within different forms of 
government - from military regimes to liberal democracies -  as well as the particular 
configuration of issues, actors and problems found in particular areas or sectors of 
activity - such as health, education, energy and transportation, social policy and many 
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others (Ingraham 1987; Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 2009) – the existence of an 
overarching variable which allows some matching of design and context is a critical one 
in design studies. 
 
FIGURE 3 – Modes of Governance  
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Degrees of Freedom in Policy Designs: Matching Policy Designing and Policy Designs 
Over Time 
As noted above, empirical studies in many policy areas have shown that many 
existing policy mixes were not „designed‟ in the classical sense of conscious, intentional 
and deliberate planning according to well established or oft-used governance principles 
but rather evolved through processes of layering and others. As Christensen et al. (2002) 
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have argued, the issue here is the leeway or degrees of freedom policy designers have in 
developing new designs given existing historical arrangements of policy elements.  
That is, in addition to the requirements of “goodness of fit” with prevailing 
governance modes with respect to policy design (noun), there are also constraints 
imposed on design (verb) activities by existing trajectories of policy development. As 
Christensen et al. note, „these factors place constraints on and create opportunities for 
purposeful choice, deliberate instrumental actions and intentional efforts taken by 
political and administrative leaders to launch administrative reforms through 
administrative design‟ (2002: 158). 
How much room to manouevre or degrees of freedom designers have to be 
creative (Considine 2012) or, to put it another way, to what degree they are „context 
bound” in time and space (Howlett 2011) is a key one for contemporary design studies. 
From the historical neo-institutionalist literature, it is well understood that complex 
policy mixes, like institutions, can emerge through several distinct processes or historical 
trajectories. (Beland 2007; Thelen 2003 and 2004; Hacker 2004; Stead and Meijers 2004). 
These trajectories  - „layering‟, „drift‟, and „conversion‟ – differ from „replacement‟ in 
terms of the challenges that they raise for each „generation‟ of designers attempting to 
integrate policy elements in effective or „smart‟ mixes with coherent goals, consistent 
means, and congruency of goals and instruments. 
 
• Layering is a process whereby new elements are simply added to an 
existing regime without abandoning previous ones, typically leading to 
both incoherence amongst the goals and inconsistency with respect to the 
instruments and settings used.  
 19 
• Drift occurs when the elements of a policy mix are deliberately 
maintained while the policy environment changes. The impact of the 
policy mix is thus likely to change and this is the result that the designer 
wants to achieve (Hacker, 2004). 
• Conversion involves holding most of the elements of the policy mix 
constant while redeploying the mix to serve new goals (van der Heijden 
2010). While consistency may remain largely intact, conversion poses 
significant risks of incongruence between the old instrument elements and 
the new goals that have been introduced. 
 
 In other words, replacement is not the only, or even necessarily the only desirable 
context for policy design; it simply imposes the smallest number of constraints on 
successful design. Except in the case of completely new policy areas or old ones facing 
the kind of total overhaul envisaged in theories of policy punctuations, policy designers, 
are typically faced with a situation in which an already existing policy mix is in place and 
cannot be easily discarded (Thelen 2003; 2004).
5
  
 These arrangements have commonly emerged or evolved over relatively long 
periods of time through rounds of previous design decisions, and even if they had a clear 
logic and plan at the outset they may no longer do so (Bode 2006). Designers‟ freedom is 
hemmed in on two sides. First, existing mixes have accumulated varying degrees of 
political support from those who benefit from them, ruling out replacement (Howlett and 
Rayner 1995; Orren and Skowronek 1998; Rayner et al. 2001). Layering is thus the 
appropriate response where key instruments in the mix are defended by powerful 
“instrument constituencies” that have no objection to the addition of new instruments 
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provided only that “their” instrument is not touched.  Conversion, on the other hand, may 
be indicated where these instrument constituencies can be persuaded that their favoured 
instruments may actually be strengthened by the addition of new goals that bring in new 
political support for the mix. Drift is the favourite strategy of political interests who are 
not strong enough to destroy a policy mix whose goals they dislike but, by blocking 
necessary change, succeed in reducing or even transforming its impact to something 
more palatable (Hacker 2005).   
 Designers thus can recognize and manipulate these relationships (van der Heijden 
2013).  Hacker, for example, has argued that layering, in many ways the simplest way of 
changing a policy mix, is a process that can ultimately induce conversion.  This is 
because, as new instruments and goals are simply added into the mix without abandoning 
the previous ones, new possibilities for relating goals to instruments open up (Kay 2007).  
Drift, on the other hand, may be deliberately used to engineer a crisis in which 
replacement becomes a real possibility as the impact of a policy mix diverges ever more 
obviously from that intended by its original designers, shedding political support along 
the way.  Layering may have a similar outcome while employing the opposite political 
mechanism when a new instrument, originally a minor part of the policy mix, gradually 
assumes prominence, perhaps as the result of setting or calibration changes, and attracts 
defectors from other instrument constituencies (Streeck and Thelen 2005) 
In such situations designers often attempt to patch or restructure existing policy 
elements rather than propose alternatives de novo in a new package of measures 
(Gunningham and Sinclair 1999; Thelen 2003; 2004; Eliadis et al. 2005). There is a 
strong temptation in the literature to restrict discussions of design to situations 
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characterized by processes of replacement and exhaustion. And there is ample existing 
evidence showing that many existing policy regimes or mixes have developed 
haphazardly through processes of policy layering, or repeated bouts of policy conversion 
or policy drift, in which new tools and objectives have been piled on top of older ones, 
creating a palimpsest-like mixture of inconsistent and incoherent policy elements (Carter 
2012). And sweeping it all away and starting again with custom made policy designs 
capable of meeting contemporary policy challenges seems the obvious solution. Policy 
packaging of this kind, which deliberately seeks to exploit synergistic relationships 
between multiple policy instruments, is a major driver of the current interest in policy 
integration and policy coherence across different policy domains (Meijers 2004; 
Briassoulis 2005; Meijers and Stead 2004).  
However, recognizing that layering, conversion and drift can also be „intentional‟ 
designs – much in the same way as software designers issue „patches‟ for their operating 
systems and programmes in order to correct flaws or allow them to adapt to changing 
circumstances – is a critical insight of contemporary design studies. 
 
 
Conclusion: Policy Packaging and Policy Patching as Design Methods 
 
The purpose and expectations of policy design have always been clear (Dryzek 
1983). It is an activity conducted by a number of policy actors in the hope of improving 
policy-making and policy outcomes through the accurate anticipation of the 
consequences of government actions and the articulation of specific courses of action to 
be followed. Regardless of regime and issue-type, and regardless of the specific weight 
given by governments to different substantive and procedural aims, all governments who 
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wish to have their goals effectively achieved in an efficient way, through employment of 
knowledge and empirical data in order to assess the appropriateness of policy means, 
engage in „design‟ (Weimer 1993; Potoski 2002; deLeon 1988).  
Each “policy” however is a complex „regime‟ or arrangement of ends and means-
related goals, objectives, instruments and calibrations which exist in a governance setting 
and which change over time.  This begs the question of how these mixes are constructed, 
which methods yield superior results and what is the likely result of their (re)design. 
Clarifying the principles enunciated and articulated in policy design proponents and 
distinguishing between intentional and unintentional process of policy change for the 
practices of policy design is crucial where complex policy mixes are involved.  
Such mixes are typically the outcome of distinctive process of policy change, in 
which elements are added and subtracted from the mix over time.  Understanding how 
these change processes create and modify mixes is argued to be critical to evaluating the 
chance of success for any particular policy mix. Adding the notion of policy „patching‟ to 
considerations of intelligent design better connects this design discussions to 
contemporary debates about topics such as “goodness of fit” in policy formulation, 
governance and steering, and the „degrees of freedom‟ which formulators or designers 
have in carrying out their work both over space and over time. 
Distinguishing between policy packaging and policy patching as two methods of 
attaining the same goal – the heightened coherence, consistency and congruence of 
policy elements coupled with a better fit between tools and their context – is a needed 
step towards moving beyond older principles or parsimony and the use of less coercive 
tools and towards enhancing the ability of policy formulators to deal with the very 
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1
 Within the policy sciences, „design‟ has been linked both to studies of policy instruments and 
implementation (May 2003) and to those of policy ideas and policy formulation (Linder and Peters 1990). 
In this sense, policy designs can be seen to contain both a substantive component - a set of alternative 
arrangements thought potentially capable of resolving or addressing some aspect of a policy problem, one 
or more of which is ultimately put into practice - as well as a procedural component - a set of activities 
related to securing some level of agreement among those charged with formulating, deciding upon, and 
administering that alternative (Howlett 2011). It thus overlaps and straddles both policy formulation and 
policy implementation  and involves actors, ideas and interests present at both these stages of the policy 
process (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl 2009).   
2
 The need to bundle or mix policy tools together in complex arrangements raises many significant 
questions for policy design, especially with respect to the nature of decisions about the choice of policy 
tools and instruments, the nature of the processes of policy formulation, and the manner in which tool 
choices evolve over time (Yi and Feiock 2012). 
3
 Policy design as a verb shares a large number of features in common with „planning‟ but without the 
strategic or directive nature often associated with the latter (Tinbergen 1958 and 1967). Policy design is 
much less technocratic in nature than these other efforts at „scientific‟ government and administration 
(Forester 1989; Voss et al 2009; Schon 1988 and 1992), however, it too is oriented towards avoiding many 
of the inefficiencies and inadequacies apparent in other, less knowledge-informed ways of formulating 
policy, such as pure political bargaining, ad hocism, or trial-and-error (Bobrow 2006).  In general, though, 
it is more flexible than planning in developing general sets of alternatives rather than detailed directive 
„plans‟ (Fischer and Forester 1987; May 1991). 
4
 They first placed only self-regulation, exhortation, subsidies, and regulation on this scale (Doern 1981) 
but later added in categories for "taxation"  and public enterprise (Tupper and Doern 1981) and finally, an 
entire series of finer "gradiations"  within each general category (Phidd and Doern 1983). 
5 Many sustainability strategies, for example, have suffered from layering. For example, efforts at the 
integration of various resource management regimes that have failed when powerful interests are able to 
keep favourable goals, instruments and settings, such as unsustainable fishing or timber cutting quotas that 
support an industry, and limit the impact of new policy initiatives (Howlett and Rayner 1995; Rayner et al 
2001). Drift is a common situation in welfare state mixes whereby, for example, goal shifts from family to 
individual support (and vice versa) have occurred without necessarily altering the instruments in place to 
implement the earlier policy goal (Hacker, 2004c). Conversion has characterized some major health policy 
reform efforts, for example (Falkenmark 2004; Hacker 2004a). Lack of a sustained and focused effort on 
the part of designers, however, can easily lead to changes in only goals or instruments and hence 
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